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TO TELL THE TRUTH: COMPARATIVE
ADVERTISING AND LANHAM ACT
SECTION 43(a)
Comparative advertising is a technique by which a product is compared to
a competitive product with the intent of proving its superiority.' In con-
trast, the more traditional advertising approach of promoting sales is based
solely on the merits of the particular product or service.2 An example of
comparative advertising in the mid-1980's exists in the rigorous campaigns
of the nation's leading long distance telephone companies, American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and MCI Telecommunications
Corporation (MCI). In their advertising campaigns, each company has a
celebrity spokesperson who compares prices and services and even names the
competitor.3 The popularity of comparative advertising in all forms of me-
dia is a recent phenomenon.
Until 1972, two of the major television networks,4 along with a number of
national print publications,5 banned such advertising practices. In 1971,
however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) endorsed comparative ad-
vertising.6 The Commission's endorsement rested on the premise that
through the comparison of product attributes, consumers would become
1. The definition may be summed up by the adage "anything his can do mine can do
better." See generally Lee, Comparative Advertising, Commercial Disparagement and False
Advertising, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 620, 620-25 (1981).
2. Id. at 621.
3. A more subtle example of a comparative advertisement is one which compares the
product to "Brand X" which was a popular technique prior to the 1970s. The use of "Brand
X" or "the other leading brand" is not particularly different from the explicit use of the com-
petitor's name especially when there are only two competitors in the market. See Sterk, The
Law of Comparative Advertising. How Much Worse is "Better" than "Great," 67 TRADEMARK
REP. 368, 369-70 (1977).
4. Lee, supra note 1, at 621 n.2.
5. F. KENT & D. WOOD, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN ADVERTISING 7-1 (1986). No matter
what form of media banned comparative advertising, there were similar concerns. Among
such concerns were that ads would not portray an objective comparison. Also, that competi-
tor's goodwill might be damaged. Another concern was that a competitor should have the
right to object to the use of its name. Furthermore, such advertisements might harm the
public by way of consumer confusion. See generally 3 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW
OF ADVERTISING § 31.01[l] (1986) (describing supporting and opposing views toward com-
parative advertising).
6. See F. KENT & D. WOOD, supra note 5, at 7-1. "[I]n 1971 the Federal Trade Com-
mission prevailed upon the national television networks to change their policies for the benefit
of greater disclosure of product differences." See also Lee, supra note 1, at 621.
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more sophisticated and would make more rational purchase decisions.7 Fur-
thermore, the FTC concluded that comparative advertising would lead to
product improvement and innovation as well as to a decrease in prices.'
Naturally, with the widespread use of comparative advertising came many
of the typical advertising abuses. Common types of abuses include: false
claims, where the advertiser claims that his product does something that it
does not do;9 product disparagement, where the advertiser unjustifiably at-
tacks a competitor's product;' 0 and false representation, where the advertise-
ment is misleading.'" The industry responded to the abuses in a number of
ways. The major television networks developed guidelines 1 2 for comparative
advertisements which must be followed in order for the ads to be aired.
7. See 2 S. KANWIT, REGULATORY MANUAL SERIES, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
§ 22.17 n.13 (1985). The FTC Policy Statement on comparative advertising provides:
The Commission has supported the use of brand comparisons where the bases of
comparison are clearly identified. Comparative advertising when truthful and
nondeceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and assists them in
making rational purchase decisions. Comparative advertising encourages product
improvement and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace. For
these reasons, the Commission will continue to scrutinize carefully restraints upon its
use.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Federal Trade
Commission suit where Warner-Lambert falsely claimed that Listerine mouthwash would cure
colds or sore throats).
10. Lee, supra note 1, at 625. Though disparagement is useful in the information process,
it becomes abusive when it is wrongful disparagement.
11. False representations commonly occur due to misuse of consumer tests, such as taste
or preference tests. See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1981) (misrepresentation in consumer test of shampoos); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Loew's Thea-
ters, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (advertisement proclaiming a cigarette the "Na-
tional Taste Test Winner" found to be misleading).
12. An example of network guidelines for comparative advertising are those of the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company:
1. The products identified in the advertising must actually be in competition with
one another.
2. Competitors shall be fairly and properly identified.
3. Advertisers shall refrain from discrediting disparaging, or unfairly attacking
competitors, competing products, or other industries.
4. The identification must be for comparison purposes and not simply to upgrade
by association.
5. The advertising should compare related or similar properties or ingredients of
the product, dimension to dimension, feature to feature, or wherever possible be [sic]
a side-by-side demonstration.
6. The property being compared must be significant in terms of value or useful-
ness of the product to the consumer.
7. The difference in the properties must be measurable and significant.
[1969-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,196 (Jan. 16, 1974) (The American
Broadcasting Company's Principles for Comparative Advertising may be found at 50,205.).
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These guidelines serve as a prospective attempt to avoid abuses. There was
also the implementation of self-regulation in the advertising industry
through the establishment of the National Advertising Division (NAD) and
the National Advertising Review Board (NARB)13
For many years, the FTC was perceived as the federal government's
champion against all forms of advertising abuses. However, in recent years,
the FTC has diminished its role in the regulation of advertising.14 The low
profile of the FTC in this area may be due in part to the deregulation philos-
13. Because of the influence of self-regulation in this field, the National Advertising Divi-
sion (NAD) and National Advertising Review Board (NARB) deserve separate discussion.
The NAD/NARB, a division of the Better Business Bureau, was formed in 1971 by several
advertising organizations. Its purpose is to maintain "high standards of truth and accuracy in
national advertising." COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., DEAR ***, YOUR AD-
VERTISING HAS RECENTLY COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NATIONAL ADVERTISING DI-
VISION ... (1985). Comparative advertising cases have been catalysts in the development of
the NAD. In its first ten years it heard 1,854 cases.
The procedure of NAD/NARB is similar to a judicial proceeding. A complaint is filed
which is followed by an investigation. Information is collected from both the challenger and
the advertiser. The NAD will come to one of two conclusions after its investigation. Either
substantiation for the advertising claim is found, or substantiation is found to be insufficient.
In the latter instance, there is a request for modification or discontinuance of the ad. Decisions
are published in monthly reports. A NAD decision may be appealed to NARB whose five
member panel decision is final. In the 15 years of its existence, no participant in the full
process has declined to abide by the panel decisions. Though NAD/NARB decisions are not
legally binding, its fuel for success is moral force. This force is derived from the industry, the
networks and media who follow NAD's views, and the advertiser's own desire to maintain
stability and goodwill within the industry.
The benefits of such a self-regulatory group are multiple. First, it provides a resolution that
is timely, informal and relatively inexpensive. Second, the NAD/NARB adjudicators are spe-
cialists in the field, thus providing a higher degree of expertise. Finally, by resolving abuses on
its own, NAD/NARB keeps a massive flow of cases from entering the already overloaded
court system.
Nevertheless, there are negative aspects to the self-regulatory process. These relate to the
fact that decisions are not legally binding. Though the NAD has a good history, its decisions
are simply less secure, in some instances, than ones made in court. There are also procedural
problems that make the process more difficult. For example, a complaint can be filed only
with a preliminary showing that a question of public interest is involved. A competitor may be
injured without the involvement of a public interest issue and may not even be able to file. If a
competitor is able to file a complaint, a final decision of "modification" may not be sufficient
compensation for injuries, as damages are not allowed. Furthermore, cases heard by NAD
may only be for national advertising, which restricts regional or local advertisers from availing
themselves of NAD redress. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., supra. See also
C. BOVEE & W. ARENS, CONTEMPORARY ADVERTISING 79-83 (1982); Gottlieb, NADI
NARB-A Voluntary Approach to Abuses in Comparative Advertising, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 498
(1974); Kent, Control of Ads By Private Sector, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
14. Former FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk reported that the FTC was aggressive a
decade ago, but now the "cop is off the beat," in regard to policing advertising abuses. Keller,
How Do You Spell Reliej? Private Regulation of Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 227, 228 (1985).
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ophy of the Reagan administration. In addition, extensive regulation of
comparative advertising by the Commission would be contrary to its policy
of fostering such practices. 5 Finally, if a competitor is capable of presenting
contrary information in response to a misleading ad, such as in a self-defense
ad, the FTC will not intervene.'
6
The FTC's unwillingness to intervene may account for the rise in the im-
portance of judicial remedies for comparative advertising abuses.' 7 The ba-
sis for federal court action is section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act.'"
This provision makes one civilly liable to another who is or is likely to be
damaged by the false description or representation of goods or services. '
The number of comparative advertising cases that have been brought in fed-
eral courts has risen steadily.2" Courts have read section 43(a) expansively,
especially regarding the diverse remedies allowed. 2 ' As courts have become
more receptive to section 43(a) cases, litigants have become attracted to this
route of rectifying comparative advertising abuses.2 2
This Note will trace the development of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
as a remedial alternative for comparative advertising abuses. Preliminarily,
this entails a discussion of the section's first application to advertising cases.
The Note will also examine the fundamental remedy available in a section
43(a) case: the injunction. The more recently developed remedies, including
15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. See S. KANWIT, supra note 7, § 22.17, at 22-54.
17. One commentator has written that "it seems reasonable to suppose that a more active
commission would have absorbed at least some of the grievances that wound up in the courts."
McGrew, Advertising Issues Avoided by FTC in Past Year, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 1985, at 12,
col. 1.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
19. Id.
Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods ... any false descrip-
tion or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe
or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce,
... shall be liable to a civil action by ... any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any false description or representation.
20. See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986); Avis Rent
a Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana
Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d
272 (2d Cir. 1981); Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Amer-
ican Home Prod. Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ragold, Inc. v. Fer-
rero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See also infra note 68.
21. See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986); Durbin
Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
22. See infra note 68; see also 4 Advertising Compliance Service (Meckler) at 7 (June 18,
1984).
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corrective advertising and monetary awards, will then be explored and ana-
lyzed in light of practical considerations. The Note will conclude that while
large monetary awards may encourage litigants to pursue such an alterna-
tive, practical matters will serve as a deterrent to seeking such relief. In
contrast to monetary awards, the developing corrective advertising remedy
is generally more effective and equitable, because it attacks the core of the
wrongdoing and seeks to cure the present and potential effects of compara-
tive advertising abuses on the consumer.
I. LANHAM ACT LITIGATION: A NEW TRADITION
A. Precursors for Comparative Advertising Cases
Congress enacted section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in response to the need
for a new federal remedy for a variety of unfair competition problems.
23
This response was due to three major factors. First, in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins Co.,24 the Supreme Court held that there is no federal general
common law.2' Thus, the existing body of federal law, including that of
unfair competition, lost much of its significance.26 With section 43(a), how-
ever, the Erie decision could be avoided and a body of federal law of unfair
competition could be maintained.2 7 Second, several foreign countries al-
ready had successful unfair competition laws for false advertising. 28
Through a survey of these foreign statutes, Congress was able to incorporate
23. See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 781-82 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See
also Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham
Act: Prologue or Epilogue? 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1032-39 (1957) (discussing the legislative
history of § 43(a)).
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. Id. at 78.
26. See Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 960-61 (1942). See also Note, The Lanham Trademark
Act, Section 43(a)-A Hidden National Law of Unfair Competition, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 330,
335 (1975).
27. See Note, supra note 26, at 335.
28. General regulations for comparative advertising are: none in Finland and Switzer-
land; minor in Denmark; permissible if indirect and substantiated in Italy; and banned if deni-
grating in Austria, Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom. C. BOVEE & W. ARENS, supra
note 13, at 85. Most European countries follow one of two approaches toward comparative
advertising as developed in West Germany. "Verbotsprinzip" is a prohibition of comparative
advertising with a few exceptions. These exceptions are (1) "Abwehrvergleich"-self defense
ads; (2) "Vergleich auf Verlangen des Kunden"-ads requested by consumers; (3) "Fort
schrittsvergleich"-ads clarifying new technology; and (4) "Hinreichender Anlass"-ads for
the common good. The second approach is "Misbrauchsprinzip," which is more permissive
with respect to comparative advertising, but nonetheless has some limitations. See 3 G. Ros-
DEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 31.04 (1986). For a more comprehensive
discussion of comparative advertising regulations throughout the world, see Janssen, Some
Foreign Law Aspects of Comparative Advertising, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 451 (1974).
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in section 43(a) the finer elements of modern practice dealing with false de-
scriptions or representations of goods or services.29 The third factor was the
restrictive holding of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Manufacturing
Co., 30 which permitted a cause of action only in the very narrow instance of
"palming off,"' 31 where the defendant represents his goods as being those of
the plaintiff. This restrictive holding was inconsistent with the United
States' obligations under the Inter-American Trademark Convention of
1929,32 which required relief beyond claims of "palming off" in cases of
unfair competition.3 3 Therefore, by creating federal relief broader in scope
than that of "palming off," the United States would meet its treaty
commitments.
While section 43(a) created the potential for important new remedies for a
variety of unfair competition problems,34 initially its use in the field of adver-
tising was very limited. Less than thirty cases were decided under section
43(a) in its first twenty years.35 Section 43(a) first received an expansive
reading for advertising claims in LA iglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc. 36
L'Aiglon's national print advertising campaign featured a picture of a dress
from its line priced at $17.95. 37 Two million promotional pieces were also
distributed through retailers. 38 As a result of the campaign, consumers were
able to identify the $17.95 dress.3 9 At the same time, Lobell advertised its
own $6.95 dress in a national magazine.' The Lobell dress was inferior to
and noticeably distinguishable from L'Aiglon's, however, an actual repro-
duction of L'Aiglon's $17.95 dress was the most prominent part of the
Lobell ad.4
29. See Derenberg, supra note 23, at 1036-37.
30. 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
31. Id. at 284. "Palming off" occurs when the defendant sells his goods as those of the
plaintiff. In American Washboard, the plaintiff claimed deception since the defendant's zinc
washboards were represented as being made of aluminum. The court concluded that deception
could not raise a cause of action. Although deception was considered to be an important
factor, the court determined that "it is only where this deception induces the public to buy the
goods as those of the complainant that a private right of action arises." Id. at 285.
32. 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833 (1929).
33. See Derenberg, supra note 23, at 1037-38; F. KENT & E. STONE, LEGAL AND BuSi-
NESS ASPECTS OF THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 32-33 (1984); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 781-82 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
34. Derenberg, supra note 23, at 1039.
35. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 381 n.63.
36. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
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Although this was a case of fraudulent representation of goods, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the
case for failure to state a cause of action.42 On appeal, the defendant at-
tempted to persuade the court to read a limitation into section 43(a).4 3 By
looking to the American Washboard line of cases, the defense claimed
"palming off" as a prerequisite to an action under section 43(a).' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to accept such
a narrow construction of the statute.45 The court found nothing in the legis-
lative history to indicate that section 43(a) was merely a declaration of ex-
isting law.46 In fact, the section was purposefully enacted in reaction to
prior law.47 In expressing the court's decision to reverse, Judge Hastie
stated that a civil wrong of false representation had been established in sec-
tion 43(a), and that it afforded a wide range of litigants the right to redress in
the federal courts.4" Under this expansive interpretation, advertisers were
now included in this "broad class of suitors" and could now more readily
resolve their disputes under the Lanham Act.4 9
Section 43(a) litigation continued to be "sluggish," 50 but picked up dra-
matically in the 1970's, coinciding with the FTC's encouragement of com-
parative advertising.5 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Skil Corp. v. Rockwell International Corp.52 further
broadened and defined the application of section 43(a). Rockwell's advertis-
ing campaign was broadly based, using both national and local print and
television media.53 Its advertisements focused on the results of a product
test. 54 Factual statements were made in comparative and absolute terms re-
ferring to the relative performance of Skil's and Rockwell's drills and jig-
saws.55 This campaign reached approximately eighty million people.56 Skil
claimed that misleading comparisons in Rockwell's advertisements cost Skil
42. L'Aiglon, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
43. L'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at 650.
44. Id. at 651.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48. L'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at 651.
49. Id.
50. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
53. Print promotion vehicles included magazines, trade journals, brochures and letters to
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a loss of present and potential customers as well as a loss of goodwill."
The court set forth five factors necessary to establish a prima facie case of
false advertising under section 43(a). 8 These requirements have been fol-
lowed and qualified in several later cases.5 9 In setting forth the first factor,
the court defined the statutory language of "false representations" to "be the
product of affirmatively misleading statements, of partially correct state-
ments or failure to disclose material facts."'  Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that there should be no distinction between a false statement about
the plaintiff's product or that of the defendant's product so that one renders
a cause of action and the other does not.6' The result of false statements
about either product in a comparative ad would be the same: deception and
consumer confusion. Commentators have agreed with this logical expansion
62 lesof the statute, and at least one district court case has implicitly accepted
the Skil interpretation.6 3
In addition to defining a prima facie case, the district court furthered com-
parative advertising litigation by setting the standard for remedies under sec-
tion 43(a).64 "In order to recover damages under section 43(a), plaintiff
must establish that the buying public was actually deceived; in order to ob-
tain equitable relief, only a likelihood of deception need be shown."
65
Through this one case the federal courts became a viable avenue for reme-
dies for comparative advertising abuses. By offering a broad reading of sec-
57. Id.
58. The requirements are:
(1) in its comparison advertisements, defendant made false statements of fact about
its own product; (2) those advertisements actually deceived or have the tendency to
deceive a substantial segment of their audience; (3) such deception is material, in that
it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) defendant caused its falsely adver-
tised goods to enter interstate commerce; and (5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be
injured as the result of the foregoing either by direct diversion of sales from itself to
defendant, or by lessening of the goodwill which its products enjoy with the buying
public.
Id. at 783 (footnote omitted).
59. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982) (deter-
mining "substantial segment" of the audience through two consumer studies); McNeilab, Inc.
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ASI Market Research,
Inc.'s immediate recall consumer research helped establish deception); American Home Prod.
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d
Cir. 1978) (false statements can be due to "innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous
suggestions").
60. Skil, 375 F. Supp. at 783 n.11.
61. Id. at 782 n.10. See also supra note 58, factor (1).
62. See Lee, supra note 1, at 632. See also Keller, supra note 14, at 236.
63. See U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-44 (D. Ariz. 1981).
64. Skil, 375 F. Supp. at 783.
65. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tion 43(a) and by setting standards, the Skil court paved the way for an
influx of comparative advertising cases.6 6 Suitably, the case coincided with
the sudden growth of comparison ads. Furthermore, unlike L'Aiglon, the
advertising complained of in Skil was more specifically comparative. 67 The
consumer goods in Skil were directly compared and the competitor was spe-
cifically named. After Skil, it was clear to potential litigants that compara-
tive advertising cases had a place in the federal courts.
B. Injunction: The Choice Litigants Prefer Most
The most common remedy sought and achieved in section 43(a) litigation
is the injunction. 6' There are multiple reasons for the popularity of this rem-
edy. Most importantly, an injunction achieves the primary goal of eliminat-
ing the abusive ad from the marketplace.6 9 The injunction stops the message
from continuing and, therefore, from causing more harm to the competitor
and confusion to the consumer. The second most important factor for
choosing an injunction is the speed by which it achieves the primary goal.
Preliminary injunctions can be obtained within months and even weeks of
the filing of a complaint.7 ° The fact that such action may be more easily
obtained in federal court than at the FTC7 makes section 43(a) even more
attractive. While an injunction is analogous in effect to the discontinue or-
der of the NAD, 72 it carries with it the strength of the law. This legal obli-
gation, rather than just a moral one,7 3 diminishes the likelihood of
noncompliance with the decision. A final factor for the popularity of the
injunction is the difficulty in obtaining further relief. Because of the heavy
burden of proof, damages are often found not worth the effort. 7 4 Further-
66. See supra note 20.
67. Skil, 375 F. Supp. at 780.
68. The number of cases was such that "[b]etween 1974 and 1982 approximately a dozen
reported cases involving the application of Section 43(a) to national advertising campaigns
were adjudicated in the federal courts. A sizeable number of additional cases were reported
from 1982 to the present. In all of these cases, injunctive relief was sought .... " Kent,
Substantial Award in Lanham Act Advertising Case, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
69. Keller, supra note 14, at 244.
70. See Keller, supra note 14, at 244 n.99 (comparing 43(a) cases such as American Home
Prod., Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where an injunction
was granted within one month of the motion, with FTC cases such as Carter Prod., Inc. v.
FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), where it took sixteen years to
have a misleading representation removed from advertising).
71. Id. See also Pitofsky, Beyond Nader. Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Ad-
vertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 693 n.130 (1977).
72. See supra note 13.
73. The fuel for compliance with NAD decisions is moral obligation rather than the bind-
ing strength of the law. See supra note 13 for a discussion of NAD.
74. See Donegan, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act as a Private Remedy for
1987]
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more, given the competitive nature of the business world, a litigant would
prefer to avoid the likelihood of having to reveal its marketing tactics which
would result from discovery procedures leading to a trial on the question of
damages.75
Due to the increase of section 43(a) cases and the popularity of the injunc-
tion, guidelines for relief have been fairly well settled. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod-
ucts, Inc.76 set forth the requirements for an injunction. Tropicana used
Olympic athlete Bruce Jenner as a spokesman in a television commercial.
While squeezing an orange, Mr. Jenner said of Tropicana's "Premium Pack"
orange juice, "[ilt's pure, pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange."77
The commercial also claimed Tropicana to be the only leading brand which
was not made from concentrate and water.78 The Coca-Cola company,
which owns Minute Maid orange juice, claimed that the Tropicana commer-
cial was false and misleading.79 The court prefaced its rationale for revers-
ing the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Coca-Cola, by
expressing concern for the great impact that television has on a viewer." It
then established a two-part test in determining the appropriateness of injunc-
tive relief."1
The plaintiff must first demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable injury if
an injunction is not issued and the abusive message is allowed to persist.82
There need not be a showing of actual lost sales,83 but there must be more
than a mere subjective belief of injury.84 Consumer reaction surveys have
been found to be adequate evidence to prove that consumers have been mis-
False Advertising, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 264, 280 (1982) (stating that "there is little
incentive to expend substantially more energy and resources to meet much more demanding
standards of proof to establish that damages are justified"). But see U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jar-
tran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 1034
(9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff was able to prove damages and secured an award of $40 million).
75. See Keller, supra note 14, at 244.
76. 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 314.
78. Id.
79. Id. Obviously, juice does not come from an orange in a pasteurized form. The com-
mercial is misleading in that it represented the orange juice as fresh squeezed when in fact it
was processed by pasteurization.
80. Id. Judge Cardamone believed that if there is great truth to the adage "seeing is
believing" then both the audio and visual aspects of television would more readily persuade the
audience to believe. These strong persuasive abilities of television serve as policy considera-
tions for regulating comparative ads. Id.
81. Id. at 314-15.
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led, 85 and such evidence sufficed in Coca-Cola.8 6 According to the court,
such market studies supply evidence that the abusive advertisement was the
cause of the plaintiff's potential lost sales or goodwill, thus indicating a like-
lihood of injury. 7
After satisfying the first part of the test, the plaintiff must prove either
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits, or (2) "sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them fair ground for litigation.",8 If
either part of the test has been satisfied, 9 the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive
relief. Where the defendant's message is literally or explicitly false, the court
will grant relief regardless of the impact on consumers. 9° If, however, the
advertisement is implicitly false, consumer reaction surveys are necessary to
determine whether the message is deceiving. 91 Because Tropicana's repre-
sentation was literally false, Coca-Cola's relief was not contingent on the
surveys.
An outline of the requirements for an injunctive remedy is not the sole
import of Coca-Cola. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the prelim-
inary injunction.92 Such action was unprecedented in section 43(a) litiga-
tion, thus further reflecting a trend of greater judicial acceptance of section
43(a) cases. 93 This general judicial mood can be explained by the court's
reluctance "to accord the language of § 43(a) a cramped construction, lest
rapid advances in advertising and marketing methods outpace technical revi-
sions in statutory language and finally defeat the clear purpose of Congress
in protecting the consumer."
'94
In advertising cases such as these, injunctions have taken several forms.
85. See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1981);
American Home Prod., Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Corp., 577 F.2d 160, 167-69 (2d Cir.
1978).
86. Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 317.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 314-15.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. This was so in the Coca-Cola case. Id. at 317-18.
91. Id. at 317. A number of cases where ads contained implicitly false claims were deter-
mined by the survey qualification. See, e.g., American Home Prod., Corp. v. Johnson & John-
son Corp., 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978) (consumer research relied on to find ad to be
purposefully ambiguous and an injunction was ordered); McNeilab v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (consumer research showed consumer misinterpreta-
tion and an injunction was issued); American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413
F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (injunction denied on one count due to lack of consumer reac-
tion research).
92. Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 312.
93. See Kent, Comparative Advertising Under the Lanham Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1982, at
1, col. 1.
94. Vidal Sassoon Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Preliminary injunctions are ordered so as to remove the abusive ad from the
marketplace as quickly as possible." However, the entire advertisement
may not necessarily be enjoined. In Coca-Cola, for example, only the
squeeze-pouring sequence of the Jenner commercial was ordered to be re-
moved from broadcast.9 6 In American Brands, Inc. v. R. Reynolds To-
bacco Co.,9 7 the injunction required the defendant to white out the phrase
"Now. The lowest 'tar' of all cigarettes" 98 from all billboards and to remove
any point of purchase materials with the same copy. In a more recent case,9 9
Noxell was ordered to discontinue shipment of its Clean Lash mascara and
to direct retailers to withhold any future sales of the product since the pack-
aging deceptively presented the mascara as waterproof. " Permanent in-
junctions have been ordered as well. In Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., Textron
was permanently restrained from making some specific claims, including su-
periority of maneuverability, in a comparison of its snow blower to
Toro's. o° ' Textron also had to retrieve all offensive promotional material
from the marketplace.102
II. EXPANSION OF RELIEF: SECURING DAMAGES
A. A Preface
No damages had ever been awarded in a section 43(a) case until the early
1980's.103 In fact, it was considered impossible to prove that a particular
advertisement or campaign was the direct cause of a loss in sales or potential
sales by the competitor.'14 However, certain cases have begun to pass the
injunction stage and open a new door for damage awards."15 Such damages
95. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
96. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 318 (2d Cir. 1982).
97. 413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
98. Id. at 1360.
99. Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
100. Id. at 297-98. The injunction also required the discontinuance of television and maga-
zine ads.
101. Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980).
102. Id.
103. Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo. 1982) apparently is
the first recorded § 43(a) case that awarded damages.
104. Some courts have expressed a belief that damages are difficult to prove. "It is virtually
impossible to prove that so much of one's sales will be lost or that one's goodwill will be
damaged as a direct result of a competitor's advertisement. Too many market variables enter
into the advertising-sales equation." Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312,
316 (2d Cir. 1982). "[N]o evidence has been, or probably could ever be submitted, that would
establish that a particular market share shift was a direct result of a false advertisement so that
money damages could be determined." Philip Morris, Inc. v. Loew's Theaters, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 855, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
105. See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
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may come in the form of corrective advertising as well as monetary
awards. '
06
In attempting to achieve either type of damages, the Skil requirement of
actual consumer deception10 7 must be proved. This requirement has been
expanded to include a showing that customers relied on the false claims.'
0 8
Probably the most important development in determining damages was the
application of section 35109 of the Lanham Act to section 43(a) of the Act by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit." 0 Under section
35, the plaintiff may recover defendant's profits, actual damages, and the
costs of the action."' Treble damages are also permitted, and in exceptional
cases attorney fees may be ordered." 2
B. Corrective Advertising
One type of damages which may be granted is corrective advertising.
11 3
This is an award of money specifically calculated so as to be spent on adver-
tising that will correct any confusion caused by the abusive ad."' Often, the
defendant is charged with the task of circulating the corrective ad.' 5 The
court may go as far as to order the specific language of the corrective ad and
106. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) (the court affirmed a
$40 million award of damages); Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (the court awarded $10,000 for corrective advertising).
107. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
108. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1958).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
110. In determining that the remedies of § 35 should apply to § 43(a), the Eighth Circuit
held that Congress did not intend "to provide one set of remedies for infringement of regis-
tered marks and a different, potentially more comprehensive, set of remedies for violations
under § 43(a) that do not involve registered marks." Metrics & Multistandard Components
Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit upheld the
application of § 35 in a comparative advertising case in U-Haul, 793 F.2d at 1041-42. The
court reasoned that damages in § 35 were meant for the type of conduct arising in a § 43(a)
case. Such use of § 35 would also be consistent with the circuit's earlier application of it to
§ 43(a) in Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986) (determining that § 35 applied to § 43(a) by virtue of congres-
sional intent for uniformity and simplicity as found in other circuits). See Toro Co. v. Textron,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980) (applying § 35 to § 43(a) action.).
11. Section 35 provides that the plaintiff need only prove the defendant's sales in deter-
mining profit. The defendant must prove the cost elements in establishing profits. The court
may treble what it has found to be actual damages or what it finds to be just damages. The
order of multiplying the damages is meant to be compensation rather than a penalty upon the
defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
112. Id.
113. For further discussion of corrective advertising, see infra notes 190-202 and accompa-
nying text.
114. Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41, 44 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
115. Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 16 (E.D. Pa.
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that the campaign run for a set duration.1 16 The statements in the corrective
ad would be selected to counteract the misleading or false message of the
abusive ad." 7 The corrective advertisement must be designed to stimulate
the truth in consumers' minds while erasing the earlier deceptive message
which caused the consumer confusion and affected purchase decisions." 8
Furthermore, corrective advertising helps support future truthful ads which
may be insufficient to counteract the effects of the false advertising cam-
paign. Finally, it is argued that specific statements would prevent reinforce-
ment of confusion.119
A section 43(a) corrective advertising action succeeded in Durbin Brass
Works, Inc. v. Schuler. 120 There, the defendant's and plaintiff's lamps were
highly similar, however, those of the defendant were made in Taiwan.' 2 '
This led to confusion concerning the origin of the plaintiff's lamps. The
plaintiff sought damages for loss of goodwill as well as for corrective adver-
tising to rectify the confusion.122 Based on evidence of actual consumer con-
fusion, the court awarded $10,000 and divided the sum between the cost to
run ads in trade publications for three months and the cost for ads to be used
in a direct mailing to customers. 123 By applying section 35 to the case, the
court awarded these damages along with costs, but did not find the case to be
exceptional, that is, malicious, fraudulent or willful, so as to include attor-
neys' fees. 1
24
A more revealing case is Avis Rent A Car System v. Hertz Corp. 125
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the lower court decision and denied the plaintiff the remedy it
sought, 126 the case exemplifies the increasing judicial acceptance of awarding
1974) (defendant was ordered to distribute a direct mailing campaign of a letter correcting a
previously created false impression).
116. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986); see Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41
(E.D. Mo. 1982).
The most famous corrective ad was for Listerine Mouthwash, whose copy/audio included:
"Listerine will not prevent sore throats or lessen their severity." Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although Warner-Lambert was not a § 43(a) case, it is exem-
plary of corrective advertising.
117. See S. KANWIT, supra note 7, § 22.11.
118. Keller, supra note 14, at 245.
119. Id.
120. 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
121. Id. at 42-43.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 44.
125. 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).
126. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).
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an expansive remedy for comparative advertising abuses. Hertz headed its
national print ad campaign with "Hertz has more new cars than Avis has
cars" ' 27 in large bold type. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York rendered a sweeping order providing for injunctive
relief, corrective advertising, and damages,1 28 despite the lack of any analysis
in its conclusions of law or any discussion of consumer reliance research.' 2 9
In a later hearing, the court enjoined Hertz from making any false or mis-
leading comparisons between its fleet size and that of Avis, as well as making
any comparison without verification. 130 Hertz was also required to publish a
conciliatory notice in the same magazines in which it had run its previous
ads.' 3 ' This type of relief is much more severe than the usual corrective
advertising order. In this instance, the entire notice, rather than just a sen-
tence or paragraph, had to be devoted to a retraction of the claim as not
being true at the time that it was made. 132 Furthermore, Hertz was required
to state that the notice was published by a court order at Hertz' own
expense. 1
33
Such an order displays a dramatic leap in the trend of offering greater
relief in section 43(a) cases. However, the total lack of analysis is puzzling.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court decision.134 With a judgment
void of analysis, the Second Circuit looked to pretrial conference statements
and comments during testimony, which shed light on the lower court's ra-
tionale. 135 Apparently, the district court judge was only concerned with the
word "cars" in a literal sense, 136 rather than the implicit meaning of rental
cars, 137 as consumers would understand it to indicate. 138 Judge Friendly,
writing for the Second Circuit, pointed out that the text must yield to the
127. Avis, 782 F.2d at 382 (displaying the advertisement).
128. Avis, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 96.
129. Id. The court simply made a blanket statement that "Hertz's claims in the print me-
dia ... violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act" and followed it with an order. Id.
130. See Avis, 782 F.2d at 382-83.
131. Id. at 383.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 386.
135. Id. at 384.
136. At the time of the ad, Avis had approximately 102,000 cars in its corporate and licen-
see fleet while Hertz had only approximately 97,000 new cars in its corporate and licensee fleet.
See Avis, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 96 (Findings of Fact no. 10).
137. Nearly 7,000 of the Avis cars were not available for rent. The number of cars actually
available for rent was less than Hertz' 97,000 new cars, thus making the claim implicitly true.
See Avis, 782 F.2d at 384.
138. A consumer study showed that 87% of those interviewed understood the ad to mean
rental cars. Id. at 385.
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context,139 and that the Supreme Court had established the principle that
"[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it liter-
ally."'" Since the claim was implicitly true,' 4 ' the decision was reversed.
This reversal does not mean, however, that section 43(a) cases may not
provide greater remedies. The Second Circuit decision left open the issue of
the corrective advertising remedy. 142 Furthermore, the court seems to imply
that it would have affirmed the decision had Avis argued that the claim,
though true, was deceptive. 143 Such a finding would require evidence such
as market research to prove that consumers were misled as to the meaning of
Hertz' claim. 44 Because Avis did not present such evidence, the court
could not affirm the decision below.
145
C. Monetary Awards
Comparative advertising litigation was altered by the $40 million award in
U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc. 146 The campaign at issue in-
cluded three Jartran advertisements. One was a price comparison to U-
Haul; another claimed that Jartran's trucks were better than those on the
market; and a third claimed that "nobody can rent a truck like Jartran
can." 47 In creating these ads, Jartran used deceptive techniques. Jartran
formulated a U-Haul price to use in the comparison ads by taking U-Haul's
basic rental fee and adding a rarely used distributive fee to it. 148 The inflated
U-Haul price was then compared to Jartran's own promotional price with-
out revealing the nature of the two prices. 149 This comparison was mislead-
ing in that it represented the disparate prices to be normal practice. 5 o In
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.
1944) (concurring opinion), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945)).
141. See supra note 137.
142. Avis, 782 F.2d at 383.
143. Id. at 386.
144. The court referred to the qualification of consumer reaction surveys. Avis, 782 F.2d at
386. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
145. Avis, 782 F.2d at 386.
146. 601 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir.
1986).
147. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-44 (D. Ariz. 1981). The
reader may become confused as to the number of U-Haul cases noted. The case in this foot-
note dealt solely with the preliminary injunction. The discussion in the text, however, is pri-
marily about the companion case which dealt with the award of damages. This latter case is
cited, supra note 146.
148. The distribution fee applies to less than 5% of U-Haul's annual transactions. U-Haul,
601 F. Supp. at 1147 (Findings of Fact no. 21).
149. Id. (Findings of Fact no. 17).
150. Furthermore, U-Haul had a policy of meeting the competition's price. This is another
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these ads, Jartran published pictures of its own truck next to a U-Haul truck
with the sizes adjusted so that the U-Haul truck looked smaller and less
attractive. ' This aggressive campaign resulted in part to an increase in
Jartran's gross revenues from $3 million in 1979 to $95 million in 1981.152
U-Haul sought and secured a preliminary injunction.
153
In order to obtain damages, U-Haul was required to successfully establish
the actual deception/consumer reliance criteria set by the Skil genre of
cases.' 54 U-Haul met these criteria by presenting three consumer perception
surveys which showed significant levels of actual consumer deception.' 55
The most difficult factor, proof of a causative link to lost sales, was estab-
lished through U-Haul's history." 6 U-Haul had never before experienced a
decline in revenue when a new competitor entered the market.'5 7 This fact
was essential in eliminating concern that other market variables caused the
decline. 5 8 At the time of Jartran's ads, however, U-Haul's revenue for 1981
had plummeted $49 million from its projections for that year.'5 9
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona devised an
unusual plan by which to calculate damages. 160 An expert economist ar-
rived at damages of $20 million by determining minimum lost revenue and
subtracting twenty-five percent for incremental costs. 16' This appears to be
a logical methodology because costs take into account market variables,
which must be taken into account to prove damages as well. However, the
court arrived at the same amount by simply adding the $13,600,000 that U-
Haul spent on advertising to counteract the Jartran ads to the $6 million
that Jartran spent on its campaign, then rounded off this figure to $20 mil-
lion. 162 This somewhat arbitrary method for determining damages has been
indication that Jartran's prices were not actually substantially lower than U-Haul's. Id. at
1148 (Findings of Fact no. 27).
151. Id. (Findings of Fact no. 29).
152. The campaign also won Jartran the "Gold Effie" award from the American Marketing
Association, a prestigious honor in the industry. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d
1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d
1159 (9th Cir. 1982).
154. See U-Haul, 601 F. Supp. at 1149.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1148-49 (Findings of Fact nos. 39-42).
157. Id. at 1148 (Findings of Fact no. 42).
158. The entrance of a new competitor is often a cause of a shift in market share. By
eliminating this factor, the advertising campaign may more readily be linked to the damages
caused.
159. U-Haul, 601 F. Supp. at 1148 (Findings of Fact nos. 37-38).
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the subject of criticism. 163 The court then applied section 35 to the section
43(a) case, which provides for the doubling of the award.' 64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
award by using a partial corrective advertising rationale.' 65 In rejecting Jar-
tran's complaint that U-Haul's expenditure on corrective advertising was ex-
cessive, 166 the court affirmed the $13.6 million damages to compensate for
U-Haul's outlay. 167  The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the district
court's application of the extraordinary remedies of section 35 was appropri-
ate.' 68 In so doing, it attributed the remaining $6 million of the calculated
award to profits under section 35.169 The court determined that Jartran's
profits equalled its financial benefit which was interpreted as being the ex-
penditure on its advertising campaign.' 70 Although section 35 permitted the
doubling of the award and attorneys' fees, 7 ' Jartran was not held responsi-
ble for attorneys' fees on appeal.' 72 In reaching this decision, the court did
not look to the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit. Instead, it found that
Jartran's decision to appeal a $40 million award was reasonable.' 73 The
court concluded that to carry over the original conduct to the appeal would
lead to punitive damages in disguise.' 74
The district court had completed its order with a permanent injunction,' 75
however, the Ninth Circuit held that the overly broad language of the in-
junction was unconstitutional. 76 According to the court of appeals, the ef-
fect of the injunction would restrain even truthful comparative
advertising.' 77 Because injunctive relief was appropriate in this case, the
163. See McGrew, supra note 17, at 17, col. 3, n.18.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also supra note I1I and accompanying
text.
165. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1041.
168. Id. at 1042.
169. Section 35 permits recovery of the defendant's profits. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
170. Jartran did not make an actual profit during the period in question, therefore, the
financial benefit theory was necessary to determine a dollar amount for purposes of § 35. U-
Haul 793 F.2d at 1042.
171. Since § 35 allows for treble damages along with attorney fees, the mere doubling of
the $20 million was well within the confines of the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
172. U-Haul, 793 F.2d at 1044.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1151 (D. Ariz. 1984).
176. U-Haul, 793 F.2d at 1042.
177. Id.
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Ninth Circuit simply modified the order. 178 This modification indicates that
although courts will offer expanded relief to section 43(a) litigants, such rem-
edies will not go unbridled.
III. REALITIES OF RELIEF
A. Greater Relief- Fad or Fashion?
The receipt of such a large award as that in U-Haul may cause others to
be less satisfied with an injunction and encourage them to take greater efforts
toward proving damages. What was once considered to be the impossible
dream is no longer quixotic. 179 The chance of recouping attorney fees makes
section 43(a) even more attractive to litigants. However, it is unlikely that a
trend in offering large awards will be the next stage in the growth of section
43(a). A number of practical considerations will deter such a trend.
Proving that lost sales were a direct cause of an abusive ad remains very
difficult.'18  Numerous market factors such as economic conditions, con-
sumer satisfaction, and degree of brand loyalty affect sales. 8 ' The ability to
pinpoint one factor as the cause of lost sales is still extremely difficult to
prove.' 82 There is also the expense of necessary consumer surveys and ex-
pert testimony to prove consumer deception and reliance. 183 Another deter-
rent is the exposure a business suffers during the expanded discovery that
occurs beyond the injunction stage. Financial position, marketing plans and
trade secrets would be available to the competition.' 84 This factor alone pre-
vents many plaintiffs from pursuing damages.
Finally, a section 43(a) plaintiff may find himself in a "catch-22" situa-
tion.' 85 One must take swift action to stop the offending ad. Any delay may
hinder attempts to obtain an injunction. On the other hand, once the injunc-
tion is secured, the damaging ad will be eliminated. Without the continua-
tion of the abusive ad it will become difficult to collect data of consumer
178. In order to rectify the effect of the injunction as placing a bar on permissible advertis-
ing, the wording was modified so that only ads that "falsely or deceptively" represent or claim
certain attributes would be enjoined. Id. at 1043.
179. The $40 million award in U-Haul is certainly an awakening.
180. See supra note 104.
181. Product, price, place and promotion are additional factors that affect sales. These
elements are known as the 4 P's of the marketing mix. For their interrelationship with adver-
tising, see C. BOVEE & W. ARENS, supra note 13, at 174-93.
182. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. U-Haul was able to prove the cause of lost
sales because of the unique nature of its business.
183. See supra note 91.
184. See Keller, supra note 14, at 244.
185. Donegan, supra note 74, at 280.
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deception that is needed to prove damages. 186
The series of comparative advertising cases, initiated by Skil and leading
to the damages awarded in U-Haul, is evidence of a trend of expanded relief.
Furthermore, federal judges will continue a progressive use of the Act as
they feel more equipped to handle section 43(a) cases.1" 7 Of course, the
overburdened judicial system will only become more overloaded. As to the
practical achievement of damages, though, there is no trend. The factors
enumerated above are enough of a deterrent for many litigants not to pursue
damages. Many plaintiffs are satisfied with injunctions which achieve the
goal in a timely fashion."88  Cases such as U-Haul are exceptional,18 9 and
will continue to be a novelty rather than the norm.
B. The Equitable Alternative
Corrective advertising w° is an aspect of section 43(a) developments which
is ripe for growth and seems to be a more sensible solution. To understand
the value of this type of remedy, one must look at the two interrelated inju-
ries that result from an abusive comparative ad. One injury is the lingering
or residual effect that the message has on the consumer. 91 The false claims
may remain in the consumers' minds, thereby continuing to influence
purchase decisions. 192 These impressions might be retained in the public
mind well after the abusive advertising campaign has ceased.' 9 3 Further-
more, subsequent truthful ads which are not corrective in nature, may serve
to reinforce the deception by stimulating the false perception through con-
tinued exposure to the product or service. 194 Courts have determined that
ads which reinforce a false belief constitute a "clear and continuing in-
186. Id.
187. 4 Advertising Compliance Service (Meckler) at 7 (June 18, 1984).
188. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
189. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Ariz. 1984) (The deceptive
advertising was clear and obvious.).
190. See supra notes 120-45 and accompanying text (discussing Durbin Brass Works and
Avis, in which corrective advertising was used or considered).
191. Judge Carroll aptly expressed the effect. "Its message remains in the public mind and
can influence consumer decisions long after the newspaper is consigned to the trash bin." U-
Haul, 601 F. Supp. at 1144.
192. 1 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 9.03[3] (1986).
193. Warner-Lambert administered its own "Product Q" survey to determine the effects of
its Listerine commercials. See supra notes 9,116. It found that consumers continued to believe
the false claims after the campaign had been terminated. Six months after the ad was discon-
tinued, 64% of consumers still remembered the message. See Compelled Correction of False
Advertising Claims, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 868, at B-2 (June 15, 1978).
194. See generally Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission,
85 HARV. L. REV. 477, 493-94 (1971) (discussing the lingering effects that corrective advertis-
ing seeks to rectify).
[Vol. 36:565
To Tell The Truth
jury," 195 not only to the consumer, but to the competitor as well. The rem-
edy ordered, therefore, should counter this long-term negative effect.
An injunction merely stops the ad, it does not avert the injury. Monetary
awards might compensate for lost sales, but they alter neither consumer per-
ception nor the lingering effect of the abusive ad. Corrective advertising is
specifically designed to neutralize the misconception produced by a particu-
lar ad.' 96 Through the choice of specific words and phrases, placement of
copy/audio, and duration of exposure in light of the corresponding elements
of the abusive ad, the corrective ad might adequately cure the harm.
Another injurious result of the abusive ad is the unlawful appropriation of
an increased market share. 197 Misrepresentations in a comparative ad have
the ability to cause a substantial shift in market share.' 98 However, even a
minor shift can affect a large sum of sales dollars. Once consumers have
been persuaded by the false message, the advertiser will be able to retain his
increased share of the market until such time as consumers are made aware
of the deception.' 99 Unquestionably, the advertiser should not profit from
his ill-gotten gain. Corrective advertising would work toward reestablishing
the fair market share. By achieving this end, the advertiser would be de-
prived of the unlawfully obtained market share.
At best, the effect that corrective advertising would have on consumer
perception would be a return to the status quo, which would be a fair mar-
ketplace where the consumer could make intelligent purchase decisions
without undue influence. 2° At the very worst, corrective advertising might
cause even more confusion,20 1 yet even this might have beneficial results.
The consumer might become confused about the defendant's product be-
cause it does not live up to its claims. Confusion about both the plaintiff's
and defendant's products would force the consumer to reevaluate his pur-
chase decision. In effect, the same fair market has been achieved because the
consumer must compare and evaluate, making his own decision.
195. Warner-Lambert, Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (although not a
§ 43(a) case, it offers valuable information about corrective advertising).
196. See Pitofsky, supra note 71, at 694 (defining corrective advertising); see also Keller,
supra note 14, at 245.
197. See 1 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, supra note 192, at § 9.03; Pitofsky, supra note 71, at
695-96.
198. See, e.g., Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ark. 1986). The
defendant's advertising had a material impact on a nearly 3% drop in Maybelline's share of
the mascara market.
199. See Pitofsky, supra note 71, at 696.
200. 1 G. ROSDEN & P. RoSDEN, supra note 192, at § 9.03[3] n.36.
201. There is a degree of doubt among practitioners as to the effectiveness of corrective
advertising. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 71, at 698 (enumerating specific circumstances
where corrective advertising may be ineffective).
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Corrective advertising is the more equitable resolution in situations where
consumer reliance is proved. This remedy is specifically targeted at curing
the psychological damage wrought upon the consumers. By redirecting the
misguided consumer, corrective advertising renews the fair marketplace. By
readjusting perception, this remedy will also diminish the defendant's ill-
gotten market share. The defendant will be deprived of the benefits created
by its unlawful advertising campaign.2" 2 In a newly legitimized arena, the
plaintiff will again be able to compete for purchases through ethical business
practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
A complainant of comparative advertising abuses has many roads to
choose in obtaining a remedy. There are a number of public and private
organizations that offer redress. In addition, section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act has been established as a viable choice for advertising litigants.
Although the section's early history saw little development, courts have con-
siderably expanded its scope in recent years. This broadening began with
the Lanham Act's first application to advertising cases, with later develop-
ments leading to the more recent expansions in remedies. Further growth is
expected as complainants of comparative advertising abuses turn to the fed-
eral courts for broad reaches of redress.
The injunction has been, and will most likely continue to be, the most
popular remedy in section 43(a) cases despite developments expanding relief.
It achieves the plaintiff's main goal of removing the offensive ad in a timely
fashion. Innovations in section 43(a) litigation have proffered damages in
the form of corrective advertising and monetary awards. The order of dam-
ages, as enhanced by the provisions of section 35 of the Lanham Act, indi-
cates the increasingly positive reception of the federal courts to section 43(a).
It should be noted, however, that monetary awards are hard to obtain be-
cause they are difficult to prove. Among the remedies available, corrective
advertising appears to be the most equitable. This resolution strikes at the
real problem caused by abusive comparative ads, the altered psychology of
consumers. By achieving this end, corrective advertising gives more than
money or an injunction alone can offer.
Paul E. Pompeo
202. 1 G. ROSDFN & P. ROSDI'N, supra note 192, at § 9.03[3].
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